POSITION PAPER: MIGRATION

‘The city is our farm’

Nigeria: Drivers of Change

Component Three – Output 30

Prepared for DFID, Nigeria

[DRAFT FINAL REPORT CIRCULATED FOR REVIEW]

Roger Blench
Mallam Dendo
8, Guest Road
Cambridge CB1 2AL
United Kingdom
Voice/ Fax. 0044-(0)1223-560687
Mobile worldwide (00-44)-(0)7967-696804
E-mail R.Blench@odi.org.uk
http://www.rogerblench.info/RBOP.htm

Cambridge, 6 September 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS

BOXES ............................................................................................................................................................. ii
PHOTOS .......................................................................................................................................................... ii
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................... ii

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1
2. Overview and Justification .......................................................................................................................... 1
  2.1 Scope ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
  2.2 Justification for inclusion of migration ................................................................................................... 1
3. The migration dimension within the broader political economy ............................................................ 2
  3.1 ‘Traditional’ migration ............................................................................................................................ 2
  3.2 Rural-rural migration ...................................................................................................................... ..................... 4
  3.3 Rural-urban migration .................................................................................................................. ..................... 5
  3.4 Extra-Nigerian diaspora .......................................................................................................................... 6
    3.4.1 To neighbouring countries ................................................................................................ ............... 6
    3.4.2 To developed countries .................................................................................................................... 7
  3.5 Forced migration ..................................................................................................................................... 8
    3.5.1 Displacement following infrastructure implantation....................................................................... .8
    3.5.2 Displacement following civil strife.................................................................................................. 9
4. The migration dimension in Nigeria in historical perspective .......................................................... 10
5. Political and social cleavages .............................................................................................................. ...................... 11
6. Political and economic environment................................................................................................. ...................... 13
7. Significance for pro-poor change ............................................................................................................ 14
8. Conclusions: forces driving pro-poor change ......................................................................................... 14
9. Recommendations: follow-up .............................................................................................................. 15

References ...................................................................................................................................................... 15

Annex 1. Proposed reports for commissioning in follow-up phase............................................................ 18
Annex 3. A note on sources .......................................................................................................................... 21
Annex 4. A comparison with other regions of West Africa ....................................................................... 21

TABLES

Table 1. Occupationally specialised migratory groups ..................................................................................... 2
Table 2. Migration categories and characteristics .......................................................................................... 13
Table 3. Forces driving pro-poor change and their impact ............................................................................. 14
Table 4. The migration dimension and key structural factors ...................................................................... 15
Table 6. Pastoral Peoples of Nigeria ............................................................................................................... 19
Table 7. Migratory fishing Peoples of Nigeria ............................................................................................ 20
BOXES

Box 1. Hyenas, snakes and strongmen; wandering entertainers in Northern Nigeria.........................3
Box 2. Agricultural migrations of the Zarma....................................................................................4
Box 3. Population replacement in Southern Zaria ........................................................................9
Box 4. Forced migration from the Jos Plateau...............................................................................10
Box 5. Shari’a law and migration...............................................................................................12

PHOTOS

Photo 1. Refugee camp in Bauchi State........................................................................................9

ACRONYMS

CBO Community Based Organisation
CPR Common Property (or Pool) Resource
DFID (United Kingdom) Department For International Development
DVD Digital Video Disc
FGN Federal Government of Nigeria
GoN Government of Nigeria
LG Local Government
LGA Local Government Authority
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
SG State Government
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VCD Video CD
WB World Bank
1. Introduction

As part of the DFID-Nigeria ‘Drivers of change’ Initiative, the consultant has been requested to ‘provide in-depth analysis to inform the Department for International Development (DFID) Nigeria’s Drivers of Change initiative on the role of the migration dimension as a barrier to change or driver of change in Nigeria’. Component Three is expected build on the work undertaken in Component One and ‘will provide detailed, Nigeria specific information about each driver using a standardized methodological approach. Analysis of each individual driver will form the basis for an analysis of the inter-relationship between each driver resulting in a better understanding of how different processes and forces within Nigeria’s political economy can influence political, economic and social change’. Output 30 is the ‘migration dimension’.

2. Overview and Justification

2.1 Scope

Five major categories of migration are considered in this paper;

1. ‘Traditional’ migration, i.e. movement of pastoralists, fishermen and specialised craftspeople, as well as mobile traders
2. Rural-rural migration, i.e. movement of populations within rural areas in search of resources, particularly farming societies in search of new farmland
3. Rural-urban migration; exploring different categories and mechanisms of movement both temporary and permanent
4. Extra-Nigerian diaspora; movement of Nigerians to other countries, both within Africa and to the developed world, on a temporary or permanent basis.
5. ‘Emergency’ or forced migration, i.e. unplanned movement following civil strife or following the implantation of infrastructure such as dams and other engineering projects

The analysis describes all these types of migration and their social impact and economic importance. It will try and project some of the trends identified and explore their relevance for pro-poor change. As this subject has been well-documented for some neighbouring West African countries, the paper will include some comparative observations. Of these five topics, urban-rural migration has been studied to a much greater extent than the others, except perhaps for pastoral migration. This has much to say about the urban bias of much sociological work in Nigeria, written from institutes and universities.

2.2 Justification for inclusion of migration

‘Traditional’ migration has always been essential to the exploitation of patchy food sources such as pasture or fish, as well as to the supply of skilled craftsmen and indeed entertainers in remote areas. Slash-and-burn systems of agricultural production encourage migration in rural areas and the complex ethnolinguistic patterning of Nigeria undoubtedly owes much to this practice. Rural-urban migration was of limited significance in the precolonial era, but has now become the major source of unskilled labour in towns as well as facilitating the exchange of goods and services with rural communities. More recently, stimulated by surpluses from oil exploitation, Nigerians have migrated abroad in large numbers and few return, representing a significant loss of both financial and intellectual capital. Migration is of major significance for the economy because of its central role in labour supply, but also because of the loss of skilled individuals to other countries. In recent years, internal migration has also played a major role in the genesis of conflict, both between ethnic minorities in rural areas and between religious factions within towns. The consequence has been significant levels of forced migration and population displacement, made all the more problematic by an official failure to admit the situation and take remedial action.

Nigeria has always had a very pluralistic migration economy as a consequence of the system of traditional city-states; the flow of processed goods from country to town is widely recorded in pre-colonial sources.
Curiously, the volume of urban demand for agricultural produce and the flow of cheap manufactured goods into the country has if anything reduced the necessity to diversify rural livelihoods. Blacksmiths, potters, basket-weavers and cloth-dyers find little demand for their products in towns, but any farmer can find a ready market for his or her produce. This is probably exceptional in the African context.

Rural-rural migration is much less studied than migration to the towns but is important numerically and is also the source both of ethnic conflict and considerable political strategising. Typically, the Middle Belt has been stereotyped as ‘underpopulated’ and this is certainly true historically in comparison to the dense settlement in parts of the north and southeast. A consequence has been that since the 1960s, farmers from both north and south have been migrating into the region, often disregarding existing systems of land tenure and creating grounds for continuing ethnic conflict. The recent expansion of *fadama* cultivation has exacerbated this situation markedly, as farmers leave exhausted rainfed farms to convert riverine grasslands to horticulture. As they become established they soon make use of political strategies to exclude the original owners.

Despite the importance of the Nigerian diaspora outside the country, little has been written about this group and they are better understood from popular magazines such as *Ovation* than from solemn disquisitions on the ‘brain drain’. Nigeria certainly loses a high proportion of educated individuals to migration, especially doctors. Many others, however, leave the country without any skills, and end up on the beach at Melilla giving interviews to BBC reporters. They may not necessarily represent an overall loss. Wealthy Nigerian expatriates are probably a financial loss rather than an export of skills, since accumulation of oil monies may not be the end-process of imagination and endeavour. Expatriate Nigerians hardly invest in their home economy except by building prestige homes and supporting political parties.

Forced migration is something of a taboo topic in Nigeria; it is hardly discussed in the media and has raised no comment among international relief agencies. Civil unrest has increased markedly in the democratic era, partly driven by the politics of indigenisation and violent conflicts in both rural and urban areas have caused significant internal displacement. These ‘invisible’ refugees would seem to have important implications both humanitarian and for broader issues of justice, accountability and governance.

3. The migration dimension within the broader political economy

3.1 ‘Traditional’ migration

In the pre-colonial era, a number of specialised occupational groups engaged in migration as part of their subsistence pattern. The main groups were as follows (Table 1);

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pastoralists</td>
<td>Livestock producers, migrating in search of pasture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fishermen</td>
<td>Fishermen seeking seasonal aquatic resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farmers</td>
<td>Dry-season horticulturalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specialised craftspeople</td>
<td>Basket-makers, leatherworkers etc. making a circuit of markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traders</td>
<td>Long-distance traders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koranic students</td>
<td>Teenage boys who move around each dry season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entertainers, musicians</td>
<td>Moved from town to town in the dry season</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. See Maps 25a,b in Barbour *et al.* (1982) which plot the data from the 1963 census.
2. James (n.d.) presents quite a detailed survey of this process with substantial documentation. However, the credibility of his case is partly undermined by a politicised conclusion pleading for greater self-determination for Middle Belt peoples.
Annex 2 (Table 5 and Table 6) sets out the different ethnic groups that practised seasonal migration as part of their subsistence pattern. The association with the dry season in the North was very strong; almost all professions returned home to their base in the wet season to farm cereals. This pattern still largely survives, and indeed has been expanded and strengthened by improved transport and the relative safety of movement. Indeed the economic opportunities of oil-rich Nigeria have meant that many migrants decide to settle permanently, especially long-distance traders, craftsmen and horticulturalists. Entertainers and charm-sellers, though, have been largely driven away by modern technologies (Box 1).

A pattern that does still survive is karatu, the dry-season circulation of Koranic students. This is distinctive to a large region of the Hausa and Kanuri-speaking north. Teenage boys move from one community to another to study under particular mallams. They may earn some money from alms or embroidering caps, but they must largely fend for themselves, thereby taking pressure off scarce food resources throughout the dry season.

Groups who migrate seeking access to the commons (CPRs), particularly pastoralist and fishermen, have found their livelihoods drastically altered by modern conditions. Essentially, population growth has been at such a high level that the pasture and fisheries on which they depended are now resources to be competed for. Farmers, often with a higher level of education and more awareness of the intricacies of the Nigerian state, are often able to take control of pastureland and exclude herders. This has had the paradoxical effect, not of making pastoralists settle, an outcome envisaged in all Nigerian Government policy documents, but to make them more migratory, as they have to travel further to find areas where their stock are free to graze. Indeed, pasture access problems in Nigeria have caused significant numbers of herders to leave the country altogether and establish themselves in less densely populated countries, such as Chad.

Pastoralists are no respecters of national borders and their migratory routes often cross international frontiers. The motivation may be purely the search for pasture, but markets and veterinary regimes play a role. Niger, for example, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world, has a veterinary service that herders feel they can rely on, unlike Nigeria, where drugs are often fake or expired. Pastoralists therefore assume cross-border identities so they can exploit both services and markets in Niger and Nigeria. To try and put a scale or estimate the volume of this cross-border movement is difficult, but the National Livestock Resource Survey, conducted in 1990 provides some data on seasonal fluctuations, as cattle populations were estimated during both wet and dry seasons. The maximum number was 14,800,000 falling to 12,900,000, an intra-annual fluctuation of nearly two million cattle, representing some 15% of the mean annual cattle population. Other species, especially small ruminants, camels and donkeys, show some seasonal fluctuation, but the scale is very small compared with cattle. If this figure is representative, then pastoralists all along the northern borders of Nigeria have relatively untrammelled movement between Nigeria and neighbouring countries, especially Niger, but also Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Cameroun, which agrees with anecdotal

---

**Box 1. Hyenas, snakes and strongmen; wandering entertainers in Northern Nigeria**

The spread of Islam across the Sahara from the Maghreb brought with it numerous aspects of Arab folk culture. In the case of the Hausa, this crossed fertilely with their own musical and performance traditions and developed into a thriving culture of seasonal migration between centres with a Muslim population, playing for gifts or selling medicines of dubious validity. Among these were:

- dán kama: comedians
- garđawan kura: hyena tamers
- dán hoto: strongmen
- dán dambe: boxers

In the absence of television and radio, these performers played an important role, both as entertainers but as transmitters of ideas, binding together and validating the larger migrant community. Some still exist but modern communications and electronic entertainment have caused most to retire.

---

4 For a more detailed account, see Ames & King (1971)
5 For a short account of this practice, see Mortimore (1982:54). Evidently it is still flourishing as encampments of karatu students were observed dotted around the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands in early 2003.
6 Full statistical details can be found in RIM (1992) and a description of cross-border migration by pastoralists and its interaction with Nigerian Government policy in Blench (1996).
Migration: final DoC paper submitted to DFID, Nigeria. Roger Blench

3.2 Rural-rural migration

In some ways, rural-rural migration is a subset of traditional migratory movements described in the previous section. However, the migratory processes characteristic of rainfed farmers are fairly distinctive. In slash-and-burn systems, agricultural communities move in a broadly circular pattern around an area, allowing long fallow periods so that the soil can recover. This system, although often condemned by agronomists and bureaucrats, is found widely across the tropical world and is generally effective where there is no access to modern inputs. It is dependent upon a low population density; once the fallow period shortens below a certain number of years, the soil cannot recover and farmers must seek alternative strategies.

Modern transport and communications has permitted farmers to extend traditional strategies by moving long distances. Rather than simply shift the circuit of fallows to adjacent regions, they can now establish settlements where pressure on land is still low and soils and climatic conditions are appropriate for their type of agriculture. Exploratory visits can be made and temporary homesteads set up to negotiate local social conditions, land access, input supply etc. Increasingly, these new areas are remote from the original site of the household and transit between the old and new sites is by public transport. Most typically, the movement is from the exhausted soils of the semi-arid zone to the subhumid zone. For example, the Zarma people have highly developed migratory structures (Box 2).

Box 2. Agricultural migrations of the Zarma

The Zarma people, also known as Songhay, are a large ethnic group spread across several Sahelian countries, with their westernmost extension around Kamba in northwest Nigeria. Throughout much of their territory, population densities are high and soil fertility low. For a long time, they have been coming south on their camels doing dry-season horticulture along river-banks and then returning to their homes in Nigeria, Niger or Burkina Faso to cultivate cereals. However, as conditions have deteriorated in the semi-arid regions, more and more groups have begun to settle in the Nigerian Middle Belt, hundreds of kilometres from their home area. Zarma settlements have been established north of Mokwa near the crossing of the Niger and north of Nguru, in the region of the Hadejia-Nguru wetlands and the Zarma are actively seeking remote areas to establish permanent satellite settlements.

Rural-rural migration is a characteristic, ancient pattern in Africa and has tended to be unproblematic historically, because of the overall low population of the continent. Demographic growth and the increasing value of access to land has ensured that this is no longer the case. Expanding populations, such as Tiv yam producers, make the newspapers all too often as they clash with local farmers in Taraba and Benue States. Settled Fulani agropastoralists, including some who have been resident for a century are being expelled from their land and violent conflicts of this type are an everyday occurrence. Urban residents, attempting to settle back in rural areas, often clash with members of their own community when try to reclaim land. In principle, Nigeria is still not overpopulated compared with many Asian countries but a failure to intensify farming systems has meant that land is under pressure in many areas.

Another aspect of rural-rural migration that has become significantly less important in recent years is seasonal migration for work on plantations. Cocoa, oil-palm and rubber in the south and cotton and groundnuts in the north all used to attract significant amounts of circulatory labour. The flow was particularly from northern areas with marked rainy seasons to areas where tree-crops could be worked on in the dry season, either via paid labour or on a share-cropping basis. These patterns were disrupted by the spread of oil-wealth and many Nigerian plantations and certainly semi-arid zone crops are in disarray.
Migration: final DoC paper submitted to DFID, Nigeria. Roger Blench

Recession in the last few years has led to a limited revitalisation of these productive industries and seasonal labour has undergone a certain revival.

3.3 Rural-urban migration

Rural-urban migration is probably the most distinctive pattern of migration in West Africa, and indeed throughout much of the developing world. Nigeria has some of the largest cities in Africa and although they may have ‘traditional’ cores, their present size is entirely a phenomenon of the twentieth century. Kano, for example, is thought to have had just 10,000 citizens when Clapperton reached there in 1821 and today has a minimum of some seven million. Entirely new towns such as Kaduna, Jos and Port Harcourt, now number their populations in millions. Similar patterns of growth are reported from SE Asia, but there is one important difference, the low level of industrialisation in Nigeria. Few urban residents are employed in large-scale enterprises, as urbanisation rests on an extremely ephemeral basis, with low investment in infrastructure and enterprise. Urban residents either depend on petty trade, manufactures and services or else, directly or indirectly, on government salaries and thus oil-wealth. In the classic model, urban migrants remit profits, stimulate innovation and bring other benefits back to the village; but in Nigeria at least there is a powerful flow of basic foodstuffs from rural areas to urban households and relatively little contraflow of ideas. Indeed this is suggested by the fact that in recent years there has been a significant flow of households who cannot subsist in towns back to rural areas. This in turn suggests that this migratory flow is not labour-driven but opportunity-driven. In other words, you do not move to the city because there is a gap in the labour market you are equipped to fill (as would be the case in Accra or Abidjan) but rather because the concatenation of circumstances provides an opportunity to subsist. Indeed, perversely, the situation in Nigeria has led to an export of skills from rural areas where they are needed to towns where they are irrelevant. For example, managing soil and water conservation in stony soils requires both technical skills and the physical labour of younger men. If this segment of the population leaves for the town then they are lost to the rural area and negative consequences typically follow. Wealthy individuals in Nigeria do not usually represent a combination of talent, enterprise and hard work, but an effective use of kinship and residence networks combined with tenuous government accountability. Figure 1 represents this situation, showing the flows of both services and individuals between different sites.

---

7 See Udo (1965, 1970), Adegloba (1976) and Adepoju (1984) for a description of these systems.
8 This statement should be qualified; there has been a highly significant flow of ideas about dress, hair, music, consumer electronics etc. from town to countryside, but remarkably little in terms of production technologies, skills in managing small-scale processing industries etc. Villages look very different now from the 1980s, but often remain technologically in the 1880s.
9 See Berry (1983, 1985) for descriptions of the part played by migration in the household cycle in Yorubaland, illustrating the role of economic opportunity within a broader pattern of labour mobility.
Rural-urban migration is presently uncontrolled and undocumented and indeed the mismatch between migration and availability of employment is probably a major source of urban discontent. The evolution of a more evidence-based policy on migration is a high priority for Nigeria. Household level urban migration has not effected a transfer of skills, but rather created a parasitic class, accustomed to urban infrastructure but without the compensatory expertise that would justify the cost to the economy.

### 3.4 Extra-Nigerian diaspora

#### 3.4.1 To neighbouring countries

The nation-state is a recent innovation compared with the older structures of ethnicity and long-distance trade and it is hardly regarded with appropriate seriousness anywhere in West Africa. Many ethnic groups are divided by borders and bonds of affinity are of much greater significance than colonial manoeuvrings. All the other types of migration under discussion can equally take place in a cross-border context. ECOWAS and similar agreements allow free movement of citizens and by and large this is the case, although economic tensions have occasionally led to unplanned mass expulsions. Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria en masse in 1981\(^\text{10}\) and attempts to expel Burkinabé from Côte d’Ivoire have resulted in the continuing civil war.

Nonetheless, the greatest draw for migration is trade and opportunities for employment. The relative wealth of Nigeria has meant that it tends to attract migrants from other West African countries. In the early days of the expansion of infrastructure as oil began to flow Nigeria was short of skilled labour and Ghanaian teachers, nurses and tradesmen in particular came in large numbers. Security guards and watchmen came in from Sahelian countries to protect the residences of the newly wealthy. Ironically, Nigeria had previously been poor in comparison to the cocoa-driven wealth of Ghana and Nigerian migrants in Ghana were expelled in the 1960s\(^\text{11}\). This type of cross-border flow continues but at much lower level because so many Nigerians are now available to fill these niches in their own society.

---

\(^\text{10}\) See Afolayan (1988) for a study of the expulsion of ‘ECOWAS aliens’.

\(^\text{11}\) See Hündsalz (1972) for an account of Yoruba movement to Ghana and their return after expulsion.
Nonetheless, trade migrations have sent Nigerians all over Africa. In part this reflects the large population of Nigeria, its industrial base and the economies of scale in the importation of consumer goods. Nigerians, for example, are engaged in the large-scale smuggling of fuel and custard powder to Chad; the trade in second-hand cars and spares is managed by a network of expatriate Nigerians all along the West African coast\(^\text{12}\). Trade networks of this type are often a prelude to settlement or long-term residence. In southern Cameroon, some traders have turned to paid labour or farming while labourers have become merchants and move seasonally between Nigeria and Cameroon.

A very distinctive subset of migration to other African countries is the movement of pilgrims to Mecca\(^\text{13}\). Visiting Mecca is an obligation for all Muslims, but until recent times, only a small minority undertook the journey from West Africa. The overland journey by camel or foot from Nigeria took many years and many either never reached Mecca or never returned staying to settle in the Sudan, where many settlements of Nigerian origin remain today. These pilgrimage routes also became important channels for the transmission of commerce, ideas and other less desirable consequences, such as disease. For example, ginger was introduced into Nigeria along this route and relapsing fever entered the Sudan via the same channel. The growth of railways and motorable roads in the 1930s began to accelerate the journey and in the early 1950s a company (Hajjair) was formed to undertake the pilgrimage by air and lorry. Pilgrimages have become entirely airline based today and the former routes are hardly used, in part because of civil insecurity.

3.4.2 To developed countries

The movement of Nigerians to the developed world on a large scale is a phenomenon of the oil-boom era. Although small-scale movements of students, seamen and others had taken place since the 1940s, only cheap air-tickets and (initially) entry without visas made this a large-scale movement. The movement seems to be highly diverse but is certainly not the outflow of skilled labour it is sometimes portrayed as, but rather an economic and status migration. Young people, frustrated by failing infrastructure and lack of economic opportunities within Nigeria, obtain study visas and then disappear. Individuals scrape up money for an air-fare and then claim to be fleeing persecution. Certain classes of trained individuals such as doctors and nurses find legitimate employment, especially in the Gulf States.

The consequence has been an almost unparalleled voluntary diaspora. Associations of Nigerians exist in all major cities in the developed world, and in large centres, these are divided into ethnic groups and subgroups\(^\text{14}\). These may turn out to be largely ephemeral as the next generation very often no longer speaks the mother tongue and is largely content to be assimilated into the host culture. Older and wealthier generations move freely back and forth to Nigeria and there is an elaborate international social network of weddings and funerals chronicled in glossy magazines.

The economic consequences of this are quite considerable. These expatriate communities are associated with substantial outflows of Nigerian oil-wealth and there is no mechanism for this money either to return to Nigeria or to underwrite investment. Indeed these channels of communication probably ease the continuing movement of funds. The skills developed by expatriates are rarely if ever put at the service of Nigeria and indeed may suggest to those still in Nigeria avenues for leaving the country.


\(^{13}\) This is a highly scattered literature, reflecting both the different countries where pilgrims end their journeys and the different starting points. For a useful summary account see Medugbon (1982) and a more detailed study of Hausa communities in Bawa Yamba (1995).

\(^{14}\) These are not well-described in the literature, but Owusu (2000) describes comparable associations of Ghanaian migrants in Toronto which may be taken as similar to Nigerians.
3.5 Forced migration

Forced migration results either from a planned (or unplanned) movement following either infrastructure implantation (most typically, dams but also roads and other buildings)\(^{15}\) or following civil strife. This type of movement, which typically raises major concerns about human rights and involved compensation claims in developed economies is hardly documented in Nigeria in part because it occurs mainly in rural areas and because of the attenuated state of the statistical services.

3.5.1 Displacement following infrastructure implantation

The oil-wealth of Nigeria combined with its dense population has given it the capacity to engage in infrastructure development on a scale unparalleled in any other African country\(^{16}\). As a consequence, since the 1970s, the Nigerian Government has been funding large projects, and many large engineering companies keep permanent bases in the country. Such projects provide substantial fees for the officials who sign them off, thereby keeping up their momentum in the absence of any obvious economic logic. Dams are a good example of this; many of the dams that have been created have never been used and those that are used normally have negative economic effects by privileging a relatively few irrigation uses against many downstream users\(^{17}\). Nigeria’s largest dam, Kainji, dating form the late 1960s, was the subject of numerous pre-impoundment studies and a fairly detailed resettlement plan which was largely implemented. Results were not always as envisaged and the human health consequences have been considerably worse than was predicted at the time, but the principle of engaging with the socio-economic survey data and evolving a rational plan for displaced populations was an impressive model which unfortunately has hardly been replicated\(^{18}\). Subsequent dam-building was carried out in a much less consultative manner, and in the most extreme example, farmers who protested being moved off their land at Bakolori, were simply shot. In a manner analogous to dams, urban development, of which the capital, Abuja, is the most marked example, has similarly displaced or dispossessed numerous village communities.

New infrastructure has paradoxical effects; while displacing resident populations it often attracts migrants who are better placed to take advantage of new economic opportunities. This is most evident in the case of new roads and the transformation of settlements along them, where traders and officials come in and the original residents move out to the surrounding countryside (Box 3). Abuja represents a rather extreme example, where the allocation of land to elite purposes within the FCT has meant that all the commercial development has been eastwards along the Keffi road into Nassarawa state, where the resident populations have been unable to protest at the seizure of their land.

New infrastructure can also open up areas to predatory migration. This is very clear in the case of the deforestation of previously inaccessible regions. Both in the Middle Belt and in the creeks of the Niger Delta, the building of roads and the clearing of channels have made forest resources available. These have attracted temporary migrants especially from the Igbo and Yoruba areas, who move in, harvest the timber and then move on to a new area. The environmental impact of uncontrolled logging is highly visible but there is little doubt it will continue. Paradoxically, by opening up savannahs in the Middle Belt, it further encourages pioneer farming, thereby altering the agricultural economy of the region.

\(^{15}\) See Shettima (1997) for an overview of these processes as well as two case studies
\(^{16}\) Some of the same preconditions are met in South Africa, but, until the end of apartheid, infrastructure development was heavily biased towards urban services and displacement in rural areas was politically driven.
\(^{17}\) See the recent studies of the Hadejia-Nguru Wetlands conducted for DFID for documentation of this process (e.g. Blench et al. 2003).
\(^{18}\) For a synthesis of the studies carried out at the time of impoundment, see Mabogunje (1973). For an overview of the long-term impact of the Kainji reservoir and its impact on displaced populations see Roder (1974).
Displacement following civil strife

Nigeria is both densely populated, has large urban complexes and is riven by ethnic and religious divisions, exacerbated by *laissez-faire* governance. As a consequence, civil conflict is common and has indeed increased markedly under the present democratic regime, partly because of local perceptions of the self-absorption of politicians and officials. These conflicts are usually only weakly covered in the media when they occur, especially if they are in rural areas, and they may or may not be settled by various conflict resolution processes. But the consequences are hardly ever investigated and documented, partly for the reason that this would present an image contrary to that considered desirable by government and partly because of the broader inadequacy of sociological research.

One of the major consequences is population displacement both in rural areas and between towns and the countryside. The victim population either moves to another area or goes to stay with relatives in town. As a consequence, the refugees are much less visible than in the standard African situation with its tents, camps, predatory media, NGOs and donor conferences. Although the government in Nigeria makes announcements of offers of help, concrete results on the ground are few and displaced populations largely fend for themselves. Box 4 provides an account of a forced migration in 2001 following civil strife and Photo 1 shows Fulbe pastoralists resettled in a Forest Reserve in Bauchi State in June 2003.

---

**Box 3. Population replacement in Southern Zaria**

The Southern Zaria region is actually Southeast of Kaduna and its traditional residents are a number of relatively small populations such as the Kagoro, the Katab and the Kaje. Their original settlements were in the rocky hills that cut through the region. After the end of the slaving era, these groups migrated down from the hills and formed villages on the plain. These settlements were usually named after the principal ethnic group; Kagoro, Kafanchan and Zangon Katab are examples. These settlements were not easily accessible except by railway and the only outsiders were Hausa traders. However, at the end of the 1970s, modern tar roads were built connecting all these settlements and as a consequence the railway began to fall into disuse and economic migrants from many other regions of Nigeria began to arrive, buying up or just building over the grass-roofed houses that had marked the original ethnically-based settlement. This process was so comprehensive in some places that almost all the population that had given the town its name retreated to the surrounding countryside, where their farms were located, and left the town to the traders and those who service urban life. Despite not living there, the original residents still feel that they are the ‘owners’ of the town and these contradictions occasionally flare up in violence. For example, in Zangon Kataf in 1992, conflict between the local Katab population and the Hausa led to many deaths and burnings of houses and a state of tension that still continues. Similar attacks on other Hausa communities isolated in the Middle Belt has begun to reverse the trend; migrants are now returning their home areas and a process whereby indigenous populations reclaim their settlements is under way.

---

**Photo 1. Refugee camp in Bauchi State**

---

19 For an account of the Zangon Kataf crisis albeit from a very different perspective, see Akinteye et al. (1999).

20 These conflicts have spawned a minor industry in books and articles on conflict resolution processes (e.g. Suberu 1996, Otite & Albert 1999, Imobighe et al. 2002) as well a variety of NGOs. But it is important to notice that many conflicts are *not* resolved and have led to permanent changes in ethnodemographic patterns.
4. The migration dimension in Nigeria in historical perspective

Historically, migration was largely confined to pastoral and fishing migration and the expansion of farmers practising shifting cultivation. In the north, seasonal movement was associated with specific trades such as entertainers (Box 1), musicians, potters, weavers and dyers. Rural-urban migration was on a negligible scale; pre-colonial cities were small. The coming of colonialism created a rapid change; not only was transport infrastructure improved but many industries opened up, creating demand for seasonal or permanent labour. The railways were an important factor in this; as soon as a north-south line was opened, traders began using it for movement of such high-value goods as cola-nuts. Tin-mining on the Jos Plateau is a good example of the permanent change wrought by industry; young men from communities all over the Plateau worked in the mines and began to exchange earned cash for consumer goods and to establish links with the city.

Box 4. Forced migration from the Jos Plateau

The Jos Plateau attracted pastoralists in the nineteenth century when its human population was relatively sparse. The discovery of tin and the subsequent growth of Jos, inevitably brought a major expansion of the farming population, and all but very marginal land was brought into cultivation. Colonial officials were already noting instances of farmer-grazier conflict on the Plateau as early as the 1940s but the low-disease environment and wide grasslands of the Plateau were too attractive to pastoralists and many began to settle and integrate with local communities.

Most indigenous Plateau populations formerly depended on upland rainfed cultivation. However, once dry-season gardening began to take off, the river edges that had provided lush grazing were increasingly taken over by farms; pastoralists came to river-banks previously covered in grass to find tomatoes. Young men herded their cattle between upland cereal fields and the cattle strayed into the crops. Moreover, the tubers and vegetables mainly grown there did not provide attractive residues for cattle and the farmers increasingly preferred fertiliser. At the same time, the ADP system encouraged a switch to maize while the growth of potato cultivation made even crop residues in upland areas unsuitable for cattle.

However, conflicts were usually settled informally and the violent clashes that occurred in some other northern states were not characteristic of Plateau. However, from 2001 onwards, the situation changed dramatically in character, with urban conflicts being replayed in rural areas with serious consequences for all sides. On the 8th of September, 2001, religious conflict broke out in Jos town, and riots between Christians and Muslims led to substantial loss of life and property. Once the news filtered through to rural areas, there was significant pressure on indigenous farming populations to attack the resident Fulbe pastoralists. This occurred at several sites around Jos, notably Miango, Vom and Riyom, leading to numbers of deaths, burnings of houses and property and theft of stock. Many pastoralists were forced to flee Plateau State and reached Bauchi, which has a reputation for being more sympathetic to Muslims. The governor offered to open up the Forest Reserves and it is there that many of the refugees are now settled; some still live in temporary camps and some are now building more permanent housing; few have any intention of returning to Plateau State as of June 2003.

Labour migration for industry has been a key element in Nigerian development in the past, when the economy was more diversified, especially in mining and other extractive industries, as well as plantations. Rural-rural migration has acted to open up large areas of sparsely inhabited land for arable purposes.

---

21 Although it has been argued that the prevalent insecurity in the pre-colonial era was responsible for significant urbanisation in the southwest and north. It is true that many Yoruba and Hausa towns date from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were constructed for defensive purposes, and may thus has established models of urbanisation (Fadayomi et al. 1992).

22 See Grove (1952) and Morgan (1979) for an overview of the development of land-use systems as a consequence of tin-mining.

23 So important was labour in the tin-mines for the Eten people that their weekdays are named after the pay-cycle of the mines.

24 Blench et al. (2003) contains a more extended account of this conflict and related conflicts in Central Nigeria

25 See Berry (1975) for a description of labour migration in cocoa production
However, demographic pressure and industrial decline are now revealing the negative consequences of these processes, resulting in rural conflict over land and high levels of urban unemployment.

In the colonial era, the concept of detailed planning for migration and urban growth was well established. The Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) had the task of preparing population models for national and regional planning. A whole series of these were published covering the transition from colonial to post-colonial Nigeria. However, the Federal Government failed to take into account the results of these studies in its First and Second National Development Plans and the situation has hardly improved since.

Another very distinctive aspect of the colonial era was the ‘settlement scheme’. Colonial governments were pessimistic about the prospects for African agriculture and were persuaded that new settlements, training farmers in modern techniques was an ideal technique of intervention. These flourished in Nigeria after the Second World War when large numbers of ex-servicemen returning were given plots of land and taught new techniques such as ox-ploughing. A very large-scale scheme of this type was the Anchau corridor, east of Zaria, which was cleared of tsetse in order to improve the farmers’ prospects. Another version of this was the rice irrigation scheme; farmers became tenants of farms and paid for water and inputs, returning the loan at harvest time. These schemes had a variable success in agronomic terms but certainly resulted in significant redistributions of population. Despite their doubtful value, the model of such settlement schemes lives on in the bureaucratic mind; the National Agricultural Land Development Agency (NALDA) was established to clear land for settlement by intending farmers who would have accessible services. Land was acquired and cleared and signboard set up, but it seems uncertain whether any farmers were actually helped.

5. Political and social cleavages

Most West African economies have a high demand for low-paid, unskilled labour and as a consequence the pattern of migration tends to be of men aged 20-40 leaving a rural farm household, often seasonally, for the city or the plantation. The common pattern is north-south, where farmers take advantage of the long dry season to work in areas of higher rainfall. Burkinabe, for example supply much of the labour force for Côte d’Ivoire and northern Ghanaians for the south. Nigeria is atypical in West African terms, as migration is much more household oriented, partly because of the predominance both of urban civil service jobs and supplying services to large urban economies. As a consequence, the split families typical of say, Ghana, are much less common. The result is that rural villages retain much higher levels of social capital; households are able to mobilise members for heavy work in ways that would be difficult in many other countries.

Ethnicity plays a major role in the pattern of movement, with specific ethnic groups oriented towards capturing typically urban positions, including the post office, the army and the police. Extra-Nigerian migration is also patterned by ethnicity; the flow towards the developed world is predominantly Yoruba, Igbo and other southern groups with very small numbers of northern and Middle Belt peoples. However, the long-distance trade axes that connect Nigeria with other West African countries are strongly associated with the Hausa and Shuwa and to a lesser extent with other northern groups such as the Kanuri. Rural-rural migration is also associated with particular ethnic groups; typically these are acephalous populations depending on slash-and-burn. The Gbari (around FCT), the Mumuye (Taraba State) and the Tiv (Benue State) have all expanded their territories in recent years, often causing considerable conflict in the process, as they tend to bypass traditional tenure systems.

Religion is also playing an increasingly important role in structuring migration patterns (Box 5).

---

26 Green (1974) presents a review of these with a detailed bibliographical listing of those that were published.
27 Green (1974:295)
28 These are described in a mainstream presentation by Robert Chambers (1969) prior to his reincarnation as the guru of PRA. Roider (1968) constitutes a useful review of such schemes in Nigeria.
Education has historically played a major role in stimulating migration; from the early establishment of mission schools, those who passed out were absorbed into the colonial civil service and later the Nigerian equivalent. An early-established principle was that civil servants were posted outside their home area, something which still largely continues in the federal system up to the present. This became a major source of economic opportunities as individuals were exposed to new regions and cultures. In the early phase of the oil boom, education was similarly a passport to civil service jobs in town and caused a major afflux from rural areas in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, with no further jobs available and widespread retrenchment, education no longer retains its allure and is no longer a driver of migration.

The literature on migration is extremely dominated by male writers and examinations of women’s experience of migration are limited. The main studies have been conducted in the southwest, although there is some material on Hausa women29. Broadly speaking, women have been considered as following men to the towns, as wives and relations. While this may have been the case in the past, it is increasingly less true, as women have more opportunities to function independently. Women have always been independent traders in the southwest and this culture has increasingly spread to many areas of the South and Middle Belt. Similarly, opportunities for women in the civil service provided independent incomes and permitted them a mobility that might otherwise have been difficult to justify in traditional cultural frameworks.

Table 2 presents the main categories of migration and their structural and gender characteristics;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 5. Shari’a law and migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The imposition of Shari’a law in most northern states has gone hand-in-hand with the spread of a more fundamentalist Islam in many areas. This in turn has sharpened Christian self-perceptions and caused many traditionalists and non-aligned individuals to define themselves in terms of one group or another. Both Muslims and Christians have traditionally been associated with specific types of commercial migration; Hausa traders engage in the livestock trade and financial services in cities all over Nigeria, while southerners are found in every northern city, selling all types of market goods and providing services such as motor-repair and food-sales. Riots and protests in many towns, especially against alcohol vendors, have caused the displacement of these communities, especially southerners in the north, causing them to move their businesses to more favourable cities. They have by no means always returned to their home area; Jos, as a northern city of Christian persuasion, has seen a massive population influx since 2001 of southerners from other northern towns. Similar problems have been experienced by Muslims in rural areas of the Middle Belt; Hausa constitute a large body of traders and officials in this region and heightened anti-Muslim feeling in many communities has caused a flight back northwards to more tolerant zones.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 Hollos (1991) noted that moving to town gives women access to educational and employment opportunities that would not be available in rural areas. Also discussing the southwest, Watts (1983) examines the role of marriage in bringing women to towns and giving them access to informal sector networks. Trager (1995) emphasises both the diversity of motivations for the movement of women and their nomadic character; movement to town is not simply a one-way flow; women move from one location to another and sometimes back to their ‘hometown’ in the quest for economic advancement. Ludwar-Ene & Reh (1993) in describing rural-urban migrants in Calabar note that women are less involve in maintaining links with the home community and more in developing new networks in the town itself. Pittin (1984), the only author to discuss Hausa women, shows that access to trade networks gave young Hausa women considerable economic autonomy compared with the village. It may be that this situation has now altered, because the imposition of Shari’a law in northern cities has acted to restrict women’s mobility (Box 5).
Table 2. Migration categories and characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration categories</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seasonal</td>
<td>Men typically migrate for physical labour during the dry season and return to farm during the wet. Herders migrate to dry season pastures without their family; fishermen move to fishing camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Educated men (20-45) typically migrate for both casual and permanent urban employment. Entire households migrate for permanent urban employment. Entire households migrate to other migration areas for new farmland. Single individuals and entire households migrate outside Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced</td>
<td>Rural households are forced to leave their home site as a consequence of civil disorder and discrimination and their return is uncertain. Rural households are forced to leave their home site as a consequence of infrastructure development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Political and economic environment

Nigeria has no shortage of documents outlining the problems of uncontrolled migration and the government policies that will need to be in place to respond effectively. Urban housing is a particular need given the highly visible overcrowding of Nigerian cities. But the Nigerian state has very limited capacity to respond to the abstractions of planning documents. A good example of this is ‘Low-Cost’ housing schemes. Intended as an affordable dwelling for civil servants and other urban migrants, these schemes were established outside state capitals and local government headquarters in the early 1980s. Many were so far out of town that they were never used and quietly crumbled. Others were used, but the quality of materials was so poor that the houses fell apart around the occupants.

Overcrowding in the cities has a whole raft of other familiar consequences. Public health can be poor, although there is little doubt that the hospitals are significantly better than rural clinics. Unemployed youth are a potential source of trouble, a consequence that has been all too evident in recent years. Infrastructure such as water, electricity and other facilities tend to be inadequate, although again usually better than rural areas. A very important effect is the rising price of staple foods. As key labour resources leave rural areas, households must either hire other labour or work more themselves, and their requirement for more cash means they must put up the farmgate price of produce, which thus becomes significantly more expensive in cities.

A lack of clear policy and an absence of data has ensured issues such as the legislative framework are without impact in a national sense. However, recent policies that offer quotas at state and local government level for education and employment to ‘indigenes’ at the local level have become discriminatory and a source of social division. This has particularly affected ‘traditional’ migrants such as pastoralists and fishermen, who are not considered to have this ‘indigenous’ status. Recent civil conflict in rural areas has operationalised this discrimination process and these migrants have been excluded and indeed become refugees in their own country. This ambiguity of tenure in the CPR arena has also ensured that predatory groups, such as timber-cutters, can move in and extract resources that might previously have been protected by migrants.

30 See Fadayomi et al. (1992) for a long series of analyses of government planning documents.
31 cf. The parallel paper by the present author on culture, language and ethnicity for more detail on this subject.
7. Significance for pro-poor change.

Controlled and planned migration is typically positive in achieving pro-poor change because there is a closer match between supply and demand of labour, leading to more attractive wage levels and increases in rural productivity as well as demand for products. On the other hand, the loss of skilled personnel abroad is almost wholly negative, since returning investment is at such low levels. Finally, a failure to address the consequences of forced migration will have significant negative results for the poor.

Table 3 lists the forces driving pro-poor change with some assessment of positive and negative features. A simplified summary of likely impact on pro-poor change is given in the +/- column.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces driving change</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demographic growth and greater pressure on land</td>
<td>Increases both rural-urban and rural-rural migration as well as reducing ‘traditional’ migration</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased manufacture of ethnicity relating to land claims</td>
<td>Acceleration of ‘hidden’ forced migration</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deteriorating Nigerian infrastructure</td>
<td>Loss of elites to outside Nigeria</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service offering little further employment opportunities</td>
<td>Educated now must return to villages as well as more recent migrant households</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased discrimination against ‘traditional’ migrant groups</td>
<td>Loss of production and migration of such groups to other countries</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased emphasis on strict religious practice</td>
<td>Women in northern and Middle Belt communities have mobility and thus economic opportunities restricted</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In some ways, these can all be reduced to a single factor, the deterioration in government authority at every level. The Federal Government exists to channel oil revenues to lower structural levels, in particular Local Government, but it seems increasingly unaware of policies and practices and unwilling to take responsibility for actions at this level. As a consequence it has become reactive, bringing in the army whenever local stresses erupt into violence.

8. Conclusions: forces driving pro-poor change.

A failure to analyse and regulate or structure migration is having significant negative social and economic consequences; improved data collection and a concomitant development of a rational policy framework are crucial to a positive contribution to pro-poor change. However, there are also fundamental issues of justice and accountability, with discriminatory policies becoming daily more established and silence from the donor community. On the whole, most types of migration are seen as politically neutral by government, but there is a strong drive to ignore internal displacement.

In the light of the preliminary analysis of Drivers of Change, Table 4 interprets the migration dimension in terms of the key structural factors leading to pro-poor change;
Table 4. The migration dimension and key structural factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current / potential impact on key structural issues</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall poverty reduction</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthened accountability</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-poor government expenditure</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-poor growth</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-frame</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-term</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Contribution to Positive Change</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of Negative Change</td>
<td>H</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A = Actual  P = Potential  L = Limited;  M = Moderate;  H = High

Increased levels of migration in rural areas clearly reflect greater pressure on land, pasture and water resources. The rural dimension paper has focussed on the withdrawal of Government from the policy-making process and the declining funding for extension. Without a reversal of this trend, migration itself is a reflection of increased impoverishment.

9. Recommendations: follow-up

At present, Nigeria has no policy framework for migration and no reliable data on which to base such a policy. There is a notable official blindness about internal refugees which is quite remarkable in international terms. To address this a two-pronged approach is required; improvements to the statistical services at state and federal level and sample surveys in selected locations around the country (Annex 1.). Governance in Nigeria is not such that movements can easily be controlled, but at least if they are understood, it will enable more focused provision of services in both rural and urban areas.

References


Aronson, Dan R. 1978. The city is our farm: seven migrant Ijebu families. Schenkman: Cambridge, MA.


Migration: final DoC paper submitted to DFID, Nigeria. Roger Blench


Migration: final DoC paper submitted to DFID, Nigeria. Roger Blench


Labo, A. & A.A. Afolayan 2000. Trans-border studies. Ibadan: IFRA.


Olusanya, P. O. 1969. Socio-economic aspects or rural-urban migration in Western Nigeria. Ibadan: NISER.


Migration: final DoC paper submitted to DFID, Nigeria. Roger Blench


Annex 1. Proposed reports for commissioning in follow-up phase

To create an evidence base for policy on migration of all types, sample surveys are required in different regions of Nigeria, focussing on the topics discussed in this paper. In particular, it would be valuable to know;

- What are the trends in rural-urban migration and what are the socio-economic characteristics of migrants?
- What has been the impact of land pressure and environmental degradation on rural-rural migration?
- What is the scale of extra-Nigerian migration and does it involve a significant loss of skills? What would attract the diaspora either to return or to invest in their home area?
- What is the scale of internal displacement of populations and what policies should be in place to assist resettlement and return?
Nigerian has a significant number of mobile populations, most notably pastoralists and fishermen. The main pastoral groups in Nigeria are shown in Table 5;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Main Pastoral Species</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arabs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baggara</td>
<td>South of Geidam</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuwa</td>
<td>Eastern Borno/Cameroon</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uled Suliman</td>
<td>Komadugu Yobe valley</td>
<td>Camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fulbe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anagamba</td>
<td>Northeastern Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bokolooji</td>
<td>Northern Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maare</td>
<td>South-eastern Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sankara</td>
<td>North-western Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uda'en</td>
<td>North-Eastern Nigeria</td>
<td>Uda Sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoDaaBe</td>
<td>Northeastern Nigeria</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kanuri Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badawai</td>
<td>Central Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetko</td>
<td>North of Geidam/Niger</td>
<td>Camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koyam</td>
<td>South-Central Borno</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manga</td>
<td>North-west Borno</td>
<td>Cattle/Camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mober</td>
<td>North-Eastern Borno/Niger</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kanembu Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuburi</td>
<td>Extreme north-east Borno/Niger</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugurti</td>
<td>Lake Chad shore</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saharans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teda (Tubu)</td>
<td>Northern Borno/Niger</td>
<td>Camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Berber</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twareg</td>
<td>North of Sokoto/Niger</td>
<td>Camels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yedina (Buduma)</td>
<td>On Lake Chad</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: adapted from RIM (1992, III)

*Only a few representative groups noted. Most all groups herd small ruminants
Mobile fishing populations are found both in the Niger Delta and on the Niger-Benue system. Table 6 shows the main groups occurring in Nigeria:

**Table 6. Migratory fishing Peoples of Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ịjọ</td>
<td>Ịjọ</td>
<td>Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efai</td>
<td>Efai</td>
<td>Islands off Calabar and into Cameroun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacama</td>
<td>Bacama</td>
<td>Benue river from the confluence to Cameroun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kakanda</td>
<td>Kakanda</td>
<td>Niger-Benue confluence up to Yola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorko</td>
<td>Sarkanci</td>
<td>Fishing people on the Niger and Lake Kainji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laru</td>
<td>Laranci</td>
<td>Fishing people on Lake Kainji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lopa</td>
<td>Lopanci</td>
<td>Fishing people on Lake Kainji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarma (=Songhay)</td>
<td>Zarma</td>
<td>Farmers in Kamba area but migrant fishermen on the Sokoto-Rima system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reshe</td>
<td>Reshe</td>
<td>Fishing people on the Niger and Lake Kainji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jemani</td>
<td>Nupe ?</td>
<td>Fishing people on the Niger and Lake Kainji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arawa</td>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Migrant fishing peoples, settled further north</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** author’s fieldwork
Sources for migration in Nigeria are extremely uneven as the bibliography should indicate. The colonial authorities took some interest in migration, in part because of their concern about the availability of labour. However, the major burst of publication begins in the 1960s, emerging from the combination of the University of Ibadan and the nearby Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER). As a consequence, the published materials are strongly biased towards the southwest and indeed the Yoruba people, both as authors and subjects of study. Publication continues until the early 1980s when it tails off markedly; presumably as a consequence of the persistent underfunding of universities and research institutes. Surveys of recent journal publications reveal very little in the way of up-to-date studies or statistical material.

The important consequence of this is that our knowledge of migration patterns in the North and Middle Belt is both historically weak and there is presently no effort to fill this gap. Many of the recent observations described in this paper thus derive from the author’s own fieldwork, which is inevitably far from comprehensive. This only goes to underline the importance of reviving the traditions of social and economic research as a basis for planning.

Annex 4. A comparison with other regions of West Africa

Comparatively speaking, Nigeria is poorly covered in the literature on migration in West Africa, especially compared with the Francophone countries of the Sahel and Ghana. Nonetheless, enough is known to suggest that Nigeria has many rather unique characteristics. These reflect several important features of the economy:

1. Very dense population and numerous large urban centres
2. Substantial income from oil
3. Powerful and politically influential northern populations
4. High levels of ethnolinguistic diversity

As a consequence, Nigeria has a poorly developed plantation economy in the humid zones and little need to bring in substantial numbers of migrant labourers to tend its tree-crops. The type of ‘circular migration’ characteristic of Ghana and Burkina Faso, where labourers move south to work on farms or in poorly-paid service jobs and return home for the farming season is largely absent in Nigeria. Similarly, the fragmentation of the household, where the young men between 20 and 45 leave the women, children and old people at the household is much less common. The proliferation of bureaucratic jobs in Nigeria from the 1970s onwards and the accompanying housing, built for schoolteachers and other civil servants encourage whole households to move to town. Towns are much larger than elsewhere, in part because of the abundant oil-wealth.

---

33 This pattern is described in some detail in Cordell et al. (1996)